This paper studies oligopolistic competition in o¤-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product di¤erentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the di¤erences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign …rms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.
Introduction
Few markets exhibit such extensive price regulation as the market for pharmaceutical products 1 . There is evidence that price regulation can actually reduce competition. Market shares of lower-priced (generic) versions of a product tend to be lower in countries with more severely constrained prices. In a recent study, Danzon and Chao (2000) show that the countries with stronger price regulations are usually those where the e¤ect on price of the number of generic producers is smaller.
The purpose of this paper is to explain, …rst, this tendency of regulation to generate higher market shares for the higher-priced versions of the product, and also to endogeneize the choice of policies by the countries. This, in turn, has some policy implications for supra-national organizations, like the European Union.
We do this by proposing a duopoly model of vertical product di¤erenti-ation in which, …rst, the government announces a price ceiling. Then, the …rms set a "perceived" quality level for the product, and …nally they compete in prices, taking into account the government-set price ceiling. We …nd that the lower the price ceiling, the higher the market share of the higher-priced variety. This is independent of the parameter values of the model: the size and variety of tastes in the market, and the size and convexity of the costs of producing perceived quality. The intuition for this result relies on the fact that market shares depend on the ratio of the price ceiling to the high quality. But the quality responds to the price ceiling less than proportionally, due to the convexity of the cost of quality.
The other important result of the paper has to do with public policy. It is not clear in this context what should be the objective function of the planner. We have been quite careful so far in talking about a "perceived" quality level. The de…nition of a generic pharmaceutical product varies somewhat from country to country, but in general it is required to be therapeutically equivalent in most key clinical dimensions as the product which it is designed to replace. For this reason one could consider that "perceived quality" should be irrelevant to the regulator, whose objective should merely be to maximize "actual" welfare. We show that under a social welfare function which uses a measure of "objective" welfare for the consumers, the implied policy is to set the lowest ceiling consistent with the participation constraint for the …rm. This is true even though the …rms pro…ts are incorporated into the social welfare measure. This is, arguably, not what we observe even in the most regulated countries. And, in any case, it cannot account for the crosssectional variations that we observe between the regulatory environment of di¤erent countries. So it seems reasonable to explore alternative measures of welfare.
The alternative we consider is to use the "perceived" utility of the consumers for the consumer surplus. We …nd that the "optimal" price ceiling, from the point of view of the companies, may be higher than the one that maximizes total social welfare (consumer surplus plus …rms' pro…ts). This is because lower regulated prices imply more competition in quality. When quality production is expensive, this is bad for the companies. Indeed, high marginal costs of production of quality is one of the conditions under which society prefers lower ceilings than the producers.
This result is interesting because countries with stronger regulations (and similar sizes, and wealth) tend to be the largest net importers of pharmaceutical products. Which suggests that regulation could be driven by considering only the welfare of the "local" agents, the consumers. This observation, in turn, leads to the implication that supranational organizations, like the European, could undertake a role in harmonizing the price regulations in a way that internalizes the welfare of all actors involved in this game, thereby possibly enhancing total social welfare. Naturally, there may be a need for supranational compensations to achieve agreements.
Earlier literature on generic competition (Frank and Salkever 1992, 1997, Scherer 1996, pp. 376-378) has emphasized the fact that brand-name drug prices tend to increase after generic entry. The simpler version of our model cannot account for this fact. However, a slightly modi…ed version of the model, presented in appendix A, predicts brand-name price increases after generic entry. The reason for the di¤erence between the models is a con ‡ict between the market segmentation and market reduction efects of generic entry.
Background and previous work
An introduction and overview to the issue of price controls in the pharmaceutical industry can be obtained from Danzon (1997) . Scherer (2000) has a section on price controls, besides providing an introduction to the pharmaceutical industry. Jacobzone (2000) is a descriptive work summarizing public policies in the pharmaceutical market. Danzon and Chao (2000) show that price regulation causes a decreased impact of generic competition in price reductions. Previous empirical work had shown some evidence of competition after generic entry (Grabowski and Vernon 1992 , Reekie 1996 , Ellison 1997 ), but the results could not compare such a large array of countries with di¤erent regulatory regimes to make informed guesses as to the e¤ect of policies. None of these studies investigates theoretically the causes underlying the di¤erence in regulatory regimes.
One of the more studied regulatory measures is that of reference pricing (López-Casasnovas and Puig Junoy 2001 survey the literature on reference pricing). Mestre-Ferrándiz (2001) studies the impact of reference prices in pharmaceutical markets with generic competition. He studies two di¤erent versions of the system. In one version consumers are subsidised a ‡at sum of money for the product, irrespective of which brand they buy. In another version they are paid a proportion of the …nal price of the good. He …nds that, the …rst version increases costs for the health authority but enhances consumers' welfare. The second system may actually decrease costs for the health system. This paper is closer to ours than other papers which also model the e¤ect of reference prices in pharmaceutical markets (Danzon and Liu 1997, Zweifel and Crivelly 1997) . The others tend to focus on the price impacts, rather than on the welfare and political economy sides of the question. Mestre-Ferrándiz, however, does not try to understand the cross country di¤erences that Danzon and Chao (2000) uncover. Grabowski and Vernon (1992) shows that generic entry was followed by price increases by the branded producer, a result later con…rmed by Frank and Salkever (1997) . This was called the Generic Competition Paradox by Scherer (1993) . Frank and Salkever (1992) or Mestre-Ferrándiz (1999) provide theoretical explanations for this phenomenon using brand loyalty in horizontal product di¤erentiation models. We show, without using brand loyalty, that vertical product di¤erentiation can also explain this fact, although only for some distributions of tastes. Indeed, Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1992), with a di¤erent sample show modest price decreases by the branded good producer after generic entry.
Gambardella, Orsenigo and Pammolli (2000) study the issue of innovation in pharmaceuticals. We have neglected this issue because patent length and breadth is supposed to be the tool for innovation policy. But their paper coincides with ours in emphasizing the need for coordination between policies in di¤erent countries. Lack of coordination would lead to (potentially welfaredecreasing) free-riding by the countries which do not house innovating …rms.
The model
We use a game of vertical product di¤erentiation 2 to analyze the problem. Consumers have utility function: U = ( µu ¡ p; if she buys one unit of the good of quality u at price p 0; otherwise
The symbol µ represents a taste parameter. The distribution of µ is uniform and µ 2 [0; ¹ µ]. The total mass of consumers is given by S. Firm A is the branded producer and …rm B is the generic producer. Firms decide on the quality they want to produce. Quality here should be understood as "perceived" quality, as generic products are legislated to be therapeutically identical to the branded products. To produce di¤erent "quality" levels, …rms have to alter consumer's perceptions, which they can do by resorting to marketing tools. So they incur a …xed cost F i = k A u°°; i 2 fA; Bg; which is convex in the level of quality. 3 We assume that k A · k B so that the branded producer can produce quality at a lower cost than the generic producer. This is reasonable since the branded producer has typically been the patent holder and has been in the market for a long time, so at a minimum there is less uncertainty about its product.
The game unfolds as follows. First the government "declares" a maximum price that the producers can charge for the product. Then, the …rms decide on the quality level, u, with which they will endow their products. Finally the …rms compete in prices.
We solve the game backwards. Denote by p the maximum price set by the government. We …rst solve for the demand faced by the top and bottom quality …rms. Denote by µ hl the buyer indi¤erent between the high quality and the low quality goods. Then, given the utility function,
Denote by µ l0 the buyer indi¤erent between the low quality good and not consuming. Then, µ l0 = p l =q l . Since µ is uniformly distributed, and the mass of consumers is S; we have that the demands are:
Assuming that the constraint p h · p is not binding, the reaction function for the high quality …rm is given by:
So that the best response to p l by the h …rm is:
The reaction function for the low quality …rm, taking as given the high quality price, is:
from where we obtain:
So that the equilibrium of this subgame is:
We …rst calculate the equilibrium in the quality subgame assuming that the price constraint is not binding, and then turn to the situation with the binding price constraint. We assume that the high quality will be produced by the branded producer and the low quality by the generic producer, and check whether this is an equilibrium. At least for some parameter values the opposite situation (generic producers delivering the perceived higher quality) would also be an equilibrium. Since this is not the empirically relevant case, we will focus on the equilibrium where the perceived high quality is produced by the branded producer 4 .
Non-binding price ceilings
We now substitute the expression for the equilibrium prices into the pro…t functions of the …rms:
he …rst order conditions for the …rms in the quality subgame are:
Let ¹ = u h =u l . Then, if we divide marginal revenues by marginal costs we obtain:
which leads to the following implicit expression for ¹:
The equation f (¹) = 0 can have only one solution for ¹¸1.
Proof. See appendix B. The lemma shows that there can only be one possible equilibrium with the brand-name producer as the higher-priced variety. To obtain the candidate equilibrium qualities we go back to the …rst order conditions and we obtain:
We have said that this is a "candidate" equilibrium. This is so because the pro…t functions from where the …rst-order conditions are obtained assume that …rm A produces the higher quality and …rm B the lower one. So there could be, in principle, values for the quality for …rm A (respectively B) such that the pro…ts were higher if …rm A chose a value of quality lower than u ¤ l (or a value higher than u ¤ h for …rm B) holding u ¤ l (respectively u ¤ h ) constant. We have not been able to show that this is not the case analytically. However, extensive numerical simulations seem to rule it out. As an example, Figure  1 shows the candidate equilibrium pro…ts (calculated numerically with Matlab) for both …rms, for a range of values of k A =k B and …xed values for the remaining parameters. It also shows the highest possible pro…ts for …rm A (respectively B) when choosing a value of quality lower than u ¤ l (or a value higher than u ¤ h for …rm B) holding u ¤ l (respectively u ¤ h ) constant. All our numerical simulations are qualitatively identical. So, at least for all those parameters for which we have checked, the candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium. Notice, too, that it is the only candidate for an equilibrium.
From our characterization of an equilibrium, we can get one result of interest.
Proposition 2 If°¸2, the equilibrium price of the high quality good is higher under monopoly than under duopoly.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Earlier literature on generic competition (Frank and Salkever 1992, 1997) has emphasized the fact that brand-name drug prices tend to increase after generic entry. As we just saw, the simpler version of our model cannot account for this fact. Generic entry has two di¤erent e¤ects on prices. On the one hand it induces market segmentation. The brand-name producer specializes in selling to consumers with stronger tastes for quality, who are prepared to pay a higher price for the product. This …rst e¤ect tends to make brand-name prices higher. On the other hand, it reduces the size of the market over which quality expenses have to be recouped. Thus, it reduces the incentives to spend in quality, and so the prices that can be charged. In the simple version of the model we just presented the size e¤ect dominates, so the prices are lower. In an appendix we study a related model in which the segmentation e¤ect dominates. The only change is that the distribution of consumers is more polarized in the modi…ed version. We could pursue the rest of the study with a model in which the segmentation e¤ect could be stronger than in this version, at the expense of computational complexity. Although this would perhaps enhance the realism of the model (and it would certainly be necessary for precise policy work), we feel that if would unnecessarily obscure the remaining presentation.
Binding price ceiling
We now turn our attention to the case where the price constraint is binding.
We substitute the expression for the price into the pro…t functions of the …rms:
Lemma 3 The equation f (¹) = 0 can have only one solution for ¹¸1.
Proof. See Appendix B. The lemma shows that there can only be one equilibrium with the brandname producer as the higher-priced variety.
The equilibrium values of the high and low quality, expressed as a function of ¹ are obtained from the …rst order conditions:
As before, we can establish numerically that there are no pro…table deviations such that A produces the low quality and B the high quality.
We can at this point check the second order conditions for the problem.
But for the values that satisfy the …rst order conditions
: So the second order conditions will be satis…ed provided that ¹¸1 + 2°¡ 1
:
From the characterization of equilibrium we can already establish one of the main results of this paper:
The relative market share of the high quality good is a decreasing function of the maximum price p, that is, the lower the maximum price, the higher the relative market share of the high quality product.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result depends on the fact that, in this model, individuals consume only one unit of the good 6 . So relative market shares depend only on the "position" of the individual who is indi¤erent between the two varieties of 5 For°= 2; this is satis…ed as long as ¹¸3 which is true if the good. This, in turn, depends on the ratio of the price ceiling to the quality (either one, as the proportion between them is independent of the price ceiling). But the quality responds to the price ceiling less than proportionally, due to the convexity of the cost of quality. Since price is, then, reduced proportionally more than quality when the price ceiling is reduced, the indifferent individual is closer to the producer of the low-priced variety. The e¤ect is actually stronger, the harder it is to modify quality perceptions (the more convex the cost of quality function). It is critical, then, for this result, that companies devote a large proportion of their e¤orts to product marketing. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies advertising budgets are typically at least as large as those dedicated to R&D.
Welfare analysis and public policy
We will discuss the issue of social welfare under two alternative assumptions about what the policy maker takes into account when taking decisions about public policy. One possibility is that the policy maker disregards the quality evaluation of the di¤erent consumers, as the branded product and the generic one have to be therapeutically equivalent under most legislations.
In this case, the authority would take into account as the "consumer surplus" a certain constant, K; per consumer that efectively consumes, minus the price paid. So consumer surplus would be:
This expression is equivalent to:
rom this expression we can easily get:
Proposition 5 The social welfare function d SW A is maximized by making the minimum possible price consistent with …rms' participation.
Proof. Both u h and u l are increasing in p: Similarly, p=u l is also increasing in p. Thus, d
SW A is decreasing in p: Although this would appear to be a sensible policy, taking into account the "objective" properties of these drugs, we do not observe regulators typically using price caps in such a strong way that it drives pharmaceutical companies to their reservation utilities. So,even if this form of regulation looks normatively sensible, the regulators' behavior cannot be well explained with this type of social welfare function in the context of this model.
There is an alternative form of regulation which can better explain behavior. If regulators care about the "perceived utility" of the consumers, then the consumers' surplus would take a di¤erent form. After all, the regulator is (or is appointed by) an elected politician, and voters probably use their "perceived utility" when voting, rather than the "objective" therapeutical value of the drug.
In this case, consumer surplus will be:
Lemma 6 1. The sum of pro…ts can be expressed as:
2. Let SW = CS h + CS l + ¦ h + ¦ l , we have that:
; then the optimal p for SW is smaller than the optimal p for ¦ h + ¦ l :
Proof. See Appendix B. This proposition is a bit hard to interpret since it holds under a condition that depends on the parameters in a complicated way. To understand this condition it is useful to see that:°B
So that°B
And from this we have a couple of corollaries that are easier to interpret.
Corollary 8
There is a value of°< 1; large enough that the optimal p for SW is smaller than the optimal p for ¦ h + ¦ l :
In words, this says that for high°; companies do not like low price ceilings. Under these conditions qualities are very expensive to produce, so they will be close to each other. Thus competition in prices will be quite strong, even without government intervention. Introducing binding price ceilings in this context may be very detrimental to …rms.
Corollary 9 If 2¹
3 + 7¹ 2 ¡ 58¹ + 12 > 0; and°¸2; there is a value of k A > 0; small enough that the optimal p for SW is smaller than the optimal p for ¦ h + ¦ l Proof. See Appendix B.
Here the branded producer has noticeably lower costs of quality than the generic producer. For this reason di¤erentiation is cheap and pro…table, so …rms can locate in comfortable market niches with substantial monopoly power. The introduction of price ceilings can disrupt this arrangement.
There will be other environments where price ceilings are not so bad for …rms. If they have similar and low costs of producing quality, they may compete as hard in that dimension as they would in the price dimension, with bad results for the competitors. So they would favor some external force constraining them, whereas the consumers would be happier just letting them compete strongly.
However, given the evidence that countries with stronger regulations (even those with similar sizes, and wealth) tend to be the largest net importers of pharmaceutical products, it is reasonable to think that one of the corollaries hold. Given the early mover advantage that the branded producer enjoys, it seems most likely that corollary 8 holds. Further empirical work would be necessary to fully answer the question.
Conclusions and further work
This paper has studied price regulations in an oligopolistic market with vertical product di¤erentiation. We feel this is an appropriate model for the pharmaceutical market when generic products compete with brand name expatent holders. The conclusions from the model can explain the empirical evidence available from this market. It also provides some implications for policy work.
We have not studied the connection of o¤-patent markets with the markets during the time that the patent holds. It would be interesting to investigate the connection between the two periods. In principle the incentives to innovation should come from the duration of the patent period and its breadth, but from the point of view of welfare it could be better to connect the patent policy with the post-patent regulatory environment.
Another aspect that we do not study is the regulation of pharmacies and the prescription activity by physicians. A more complete model should include all those actors, and the incentives provided for their activities.
But we feel that the more rewarding area for future work would be the empirical investigation of determinants of policies across countries. We have emphasized that the importance of foreign versus national production of pharmaceutical products is key in determining the regulatory regime. Although there is some evidence in that direction, a more careful study of that, and other aspects in ‡uencing regulation, would be necessary.
Appendix A
In this appendix we propose a variation of our model which can account for the fact that the producer of the high-priced variety charges a higher price under competition than under monopoly. As in the main text we have that consumers have utility functions: µu ¡ p;if she buys one unit of the good of quality u at price p; and 0 otherwise. But now the distribution of µ is not uniform, but rather has a two point support. A proportion p of the population has a taste parameter and ¹ µ and a proportion (1 ¡ p) has a taste parameter µ. The total mass of consumers is given by S. The …xed cost of quality level u is as before, F i = k A u°°; i 2 fA; Bg. The game unfolds as follows. The …rms decide on the (unique) quality level, u, with which they will endow their products 7 . Then the …rms compete in prices.
First, we analyze the game under monopoly. We will later turn to the duopoly case.
Suppose …rst that the …rm decides to serve both consumer types. We will check later under which conditions this is optimal. If both types of consumer are served, then the price will be p m = µu m so that pro…ts are
Suppose now that only the high type of consumer is served., then the price will be p m = ¹ µu m so that pro…ts are
The condition for the market to be served entirely is then ¹ µp · µ or ¹ µp µ
· 1: Let us analyze now the duopoly case. In the price game the low price …rm will charge p l = µu l : The high price p h has to be set so that the low quality …rm does not want to attract the consumers with higher preference for quality. To do that, the low quality …rm would have to set p ¤ such that 
Now we can solve the quality subgame.
1 : Thus we have that:
The previous discusion can be summarized in the following
Proposition 10
The price of the high quality variety under duopoly is higher than the price under monopoly (that is, p h¸pm ) if:
and remember that to have the monopolist catering to the whole population we need¸p · 1: Corollary 11 If°= 2; then the price of the high quality variety under duopoly is higher than the price under monopoly (that is, p h¸pm ) if:
Proof. From the proposition we have that if°= 2; p h =p m¸1 wheņ
A straightforward manipulation of the expression leads to the result. The condition in the corollary reduces to¸p¸¸+
7 Appendix B Proof of Lemma 1 First note that f (¹) < 0 for ¹ · 7 4 ; so that any solution has to be larger than 7 4 : We will now show that to the right of 7 4 ; the function f is …rst decreasing and then increasing. Since f ( 7 4 ) < 0; and the function has to be eventually positive, the result will follow.
Let ¹ ¤ be the lowest value of ¹¸7 4 such that f 0 (¹ ¤ ) = 0: Since f 0 (
) < 0; this implies that f 0 (¹) must be increasing at ¹ = ¹ ¤ : Thus f 00 (¹ ¤ ) > 0: Also, notice that f 0 is a convex function to the right of : Thus, for
The price under monopoly, is given by p m = ¹ µ 2 u m ; and the optimal quality
: This implies that
Since ¹¸1, we have that
1 if and only if ¡192¹ 3 + 96¹ 2 + 112¹ ¡ 129 < 0: This is true since this is a decreasing function (¡576¹ 2 + 192¹ 2 + 112 < 0) when ¹¸1 and ¡192 + 96 + 112 ¡ 129 < 0:
Proof of lemma 3
We will now show that to the right of 1; the function f is either always increasing, or …rst decreasing and then increasing. Since f(1) < 0; and the function has to be eventually positive, the result will follow.
Suppose …rst that f 0 (1) =
(°+ 1) ¡ 4¸0: Then, since°¸2; we have that (°+1)°2 ¡4¸0: Since f 0 is a convex function to the right of 1; it must be true for ¹¸1 that f 0 (¹)¸f 0 (1)+f 00 (1)(¹¡1)¸0: Now, assume that f 0 (1) < 0: Let ¹ ¤ be the lowest value of ¹¸1 such that f 0 (¹ ¤ ) = 0:
Since f 0 (1) < 0; this implies that f 0 (¹) must be increasing at ¹ = ¹ ¤ : Thus f 00 (¹ ¤ )¸0: Since f 0 is a convex function to the right of 1: Thus, for ¹¸¹ ¤ ; we have that f 0 (¹)¸f 0 (¹ ¤ ) + f 00 (¹ ¤ )(¹ ¡ ¹ ¤ ) = f 00 (¹ ¤ )(¹ ¡ ¹ ¤ )¸0; and f 0 (¹)¸0, for ¹¸¹ ¤ : Since ¹ ¤ is the lowest value of ¹¸1 such that f 0 (¹ ¤ ) = 0; then f 0 (¹) · 0, for 7 4 · ¹ · ¹ ¤ :
Proof of Proposition 4
We have that p ¡ p l = p ¡ p=2¹; and u h ¡ u l = (¹ ¡ 1)u l : This means that
If we substitute into this expression the value for u l we have:
Since ¹ does not depend on p; and°> 1, this function is clearly decreasing in p: Proof of Lemma 6. 
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Proof of Corollary 9
If k A = 0; we have that°B A 
